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A merger proposal discloses a bidder firm’s desire to purchase the control rights in a target firm. Predicting
who will propose (bidder candidacy) and who will receive (target candidacy) merger bids is important
to investigate why firms merge and to measure the price impact of mergers. This study investigates the
performance of artificial neural networks and multinomial logit models in predicting bidder and target
candidacy. We use a comprehensive data set that covers the years 1979–2004 and includes all deals with
publicly listed bidders and targets. We find that both models perform similarly while predicting target and
non-merger firms. The multinomial logit model performs slightly better in predicting bidder firms.
Keywords: mergers; artificial neural network models; multinomial logistic models
1. Introduction
Merger announcements disclose the intent of bidder firms to purchase control rights in a target firm.
Models of target and bidder candidacy are important for three reasons. First, these models allow
us to test theories of merger motives. Second, if merger candidacy is predictable, bidder and target
shares would reflect the impact of mergers prior to merger announcements.As a result, event study
methods that calculate returns around merger announcements may incorrectly measure the price
impact of mergers [9,20,45]. Event study methods assume that merger announcements are random
and measure price impact of mergers in a tight window of time (usually three days) around the
announcement. However, mergers are not random. Managers choose to merge. Hence, modeling
target and bidder candidacy are important. Third, hedge funds use investment strategies called
‘merger arbitrage’ that rely on the prediction of bidder and target companies. Merger arbitrageurs
realize profits conditional on whether deals are successfully completed [35,36]. To understand the
possible impact of merger arbitrage strategies, one needs to model and estimate merger choice
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and deal completion. This study investigates the performance of artificial neural network (ANN)
and multinomial logistic models in predicting bidder and target candidacy.
Previous merger studies use two approaches to model bidder candidacy. First approach identifies
a single firm characteristic that is used for classification of anticipated and unanticipated bidder
firms [5,16,24,32,34,42,44]. Second approach develops predictive models of bidder candidacy that
use multiple firm characteristics to classify anticipated versus unanticipated bidders [2,3,9,10,12,
13,39,41]. The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, this study constructs a comprehensive
data set of publicly listed bidders and targets. The sample covers the years from 1979 to 2004 with
5207 bidder observations, 2641 target observations and 308,079 non-merger firm observations.
Second, we estimate bidder as well as target candidacy (instead of estimating only bidder or only
target candidacy). Third, the paper runs a horse-race between two methods,1 namely multinomial
logit and ANN models.
We find that ANN and multinomial logistic models perform similarly while predicting target
and non-merger firms. The multinomial logistic model performs better in predicting bidder firms.
Multinomial logistic models yield coefficient estimates that have economic meaning.ANN models
work as a blackbox and do not automatically reveal coefficient estimates. This is why we con-
clude that multinomial logit models outperform ANN models both in predictive and interpretative
performance.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the proxies for merger motives used
to model the merger choice, and introduces the multinomial logistic and ANN models used to
estimate merger candidacy. Section 3 compares the results obtained with multinomial logistic and
ANN models. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Research method
This section develops models to predict the merger choice of firms. At any point of time, managers
choose between three alternatives: (i) to propose a bid to attain control rights in another company
(bidder firm), (ii) to solicit/receive bids for control rights in their company (target firm) and (iii)
to neither propose nor solicit bids (non-merger firm). Finance theory proposes several variables
that may predict bidder and target candidacy. Section 2.1 explains these variables and Section 2.2
describes how we estimate bidder and target candidacy using ANN models and multinomial logit
models.
2.1 Sampling frame and description of variables
We follow the strategy of Cornett et al. [9] and Tanyeri [45] to construct the sample of merging and
non-merging firms and to develop predictors of merger candidacy. The sample of merging firms
are from the database of Security Data Company and cover the period from 16 November 1977
to 30 December 2004. We restrict the merging sample to include those deals in which bidders
must hold less than 50% of outstanding target shares before the merger announcement and must
propose to hold more than 50% of target shares after the merger. Sample firms are non-financial
US enterprises due to the differences in regulatory environment and the lack of data availability
for foreign and financial firms. We also require sample firms to be public companies.
Identical filters are used to construct the non-merging-firms sample as the filters used in com-
piling the sample of merging firms. We compile a sample of US, non-financial firms using the
CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database. The sample includes 110 quarters starting from the third
quarter of 1977 and ending in the fourth quarter of 2004. We map the merging sample onto
the CRSP-COMPUSTAT data for identification of bidder, target and non-merger firms. A firm-
quarter is defined as: a bidder-quarter if the firm makes at least one merger bid in the next quarter,
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if the firm neither makes nor gets any bids in the next quarter. We also require that the firms have
non-missing data for variable construction and drop the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles
to reduce the effect of outliers. These filters produce 2530 firms proposing 5400 bids in 5207 firm
quarters, 2352 firms receiving 2706 bids in 2641 firm quarters and 11,010 firms neither proposing
nor receiving bids in 308,079 firm quarters.
Table 1 summarizes the sample. First rows list the average book values of assets (in million
dollars) of bidder, target and non-merger firms in each year. Second rows list the number of
bidder, target and non-merger firms in each year. The second half of the sample (covering the
years 1991–2004) is richer than the first half (covering the years 1979–1990) in terms of merging
firms. There are, on average, 262 bidders and 125 targets per year in the second half and 128
bidders and 74 targets per year in the first half. Bidders prove largest (on average 3538 million
dollars) in terms of book value of assets. Non-merging firms (on average 1421 million dollars)
are larger than targets (on average, 962 million dollars). The size distribution indicates that the
larger sample firms buy the smaller firms.
We review theories on merger motives to develop predictors for merger candidacy. Managers
may engage in mergers to create value for shareholders and/or to protect themselves from losing
the non-monetary benefits associated with their managerial positions. Managers may create share-
holder value by: (i) increasing efficiency of human and financial capitals; (ii) attaining economies
of scale and scope; and (iii) increasing market power [15,17,21,28]. Incentive conflicts between
managers and shareholders may also lead to mergers when opportunistic managers focus on
generating value for themselves at the expense of shareholders [11,19,25–27,40,43].
Eight variables,2 namely sales shock, square of sales shock, asset size, asset growth, sales
growth, concentration ratio, resource-growth mismatch and return on assets (ROA), represent
merger motives to generate shareholder value. Sales shock (the absolute value of the two-year
median industry3 sales growth rate minus the two-year median sales growth rate for all sample
firms) is a measure of economic disturbances which may motivate mergers [4,17,33]. The square
of sales shock allows for nonlinearity in the sales shock variable. The asset size (the log of total
assets), asset growth (the two-year growth rate of assets) and sales growth (the two-year growth
rate in sales) variables affect the willingness to increase the economies of scale and scope through
mergers and, therefore, reduce costs [3,17,37,39]. The concentration ratio variable (cumulates
the sales of the largest four firms and divides by total industry sales) measures the ease of entry
and exit into the industry [13,17]. The resource-growth mismatch indicator compares the capital
resources and growth opportunities of a firm with the industry median (the indicator takes on the
value one (zero) if the two-year sales growth is larger (smaller) than the industry median and the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets is lower (higher) than the industry median) [3,15,39]. If there
is a resource-growth mismatch, the firm may engage in mergers. We use ROA (the book value of
net income divided by total assets) variable to measure the match quality between bidders and
targets [2,3,29,33,39].
Cash ratio, prior mergers and industry mergers variables measure managerial motives to protect
opportunistic benefits through mergers. The cash ratio variable measures the ratio of cash reserves
(cash and marketable securities divided by total assets). Large cash reserves enable managers to
propose empire-building mergers and desist takeovers. The prior mergers variable (defined as the
number of merger bids (received or made) in the prior two years excluding the current bid) also
proxies for empire-building motives [5,16,21,24,32,34,42]. The desire to avoid risk by joining the
herd may also motivate mergers. The industry mergers variable (the number of industry firms that
made or received a bid divided by the total number of industry firms; ratio cumulated for the past
two years) measures merger clustering in time and industry. Another approach to measure merger
clustering in time would be to keep target, bidder and non-merger ratios separately and perform
compositional time series analysis [6], however, industry mergers itself (which is a composition
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Table 1. Asset size and distribution of bidders, targets and non-merger firms across years.
Year Bidder Target Non-merger
1979 1992 869 806
5 3 3931
1980 2831 573 870
40 24 7553
1981 1510 396 951
105 53 6880
1982 1205 500 1080
176 41 7010
1983 1136 523 1131
261 55 7791
1984 1527 761 804
264 85 11,034
1985 2150 1025 783
83 101 12,196
1986 2446 380 860
116 124 12,430
1987 4294 639 917
112 114 12,045
1988 5052 1179 1023
109 116 12,186
1989 4064 529 1075
155 102 12,702
1990 3518 2342 1173
114 74 12,644
1991 1981 251 1268
180 61 12,440
1992 3060 609 1313
183 57 12,468
1993 2248 453 1393
187 84 12,699
1994 2411 536 1351
234 98 13,433
1995 2248 581 1347
330 143 14,068
1996 4197 1153 1333
343 139 14,864
1997 3084 874 1455
374 216 15,302
1998 3226 1251 1552
361 228 15,488
1999 5558 1431 1714
355 249 15,034
2000 8553 1406 2029
280 157 13,925
2001 5373 1756 2384
218 106 13,114
2002 7712 1456 2443
184 58 12,751
2003 5619 1480 2693
234 91 12,791
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Mispricing of shares may affect investment decisions; hence merger decisions [38]. Two alter-
native hypotheses exist on whether managers use their private information about mispriced shares
to act in shareholder interests or to protect non-monetary benefits. Eckbo et al. [13], Hanson [18]
and Rhoades-Kropf and Viswanathan [40] agree that managerial beliefs about stock overvaluation
may motivate stock-financed mergers. These mergers motivated by overvaluation aim to create
value for pre-merger shareholders in the long run while decreasing value for those shareholders
who invest in the company after the merger announcement. Jensen [26] argues that managerial
beliefs about stock overvaluation may motivate mergers financed with overvalued equity when
managers want to generate and/or protect opportunistic benefits. Three variables, share turnover
(defined as the number of traded stock shares divided by the total outstanding shares), price
run-up (defined as the two-year change in stock price) and information asymmetry (defined as
an indicator that is one if the market-to-book value4 is higher than the industry median and the
firm’s share turnover is lower than its industry median), are proxies for managerial motives to
take advantage of its information advantage.
2.2 ANN and multinomial logistic models
We use the 10-fold cross-validation method to estimate the performance of ANN and the multi-
nomial logit models. We randomly separate the data into 10 subsamples and train the models on
9 subsamples and use the results of the model to estimate bidder and target firms on the 10th
subsample. We iterate this procedure for the 10 subsamples. We combine the estimation results
from the 10 subsamples and arrive at the full sample results [30].
The sample is imbalanced in the target, bidder and non-merger classes. The number of non-
merger quarters is almost 60 times more than the number of bidder quarters and 117 times more
than the target quarters. This kind of imbalance adversely affects the performance of learning
algorithms which assume a balanced class distribution [31]. To check whether multinomial logistic
models predictive performance also suffers when the data are imbalanced, we ran the multinomial
logistic model with no under-sampling. Untabulated results indicate that the model failed to predict
bidder and target candidacy (the prediction success for bidders is 0.88% and is 0% for targets).
As a result, we use the under-sampling method both in the ANN and multinomial logistic models.
In the nine training subsamples, we under-sample the classes with the higher number of elements
(non-merging firm and bidder firm quarters) to the size of the minimum class (target firm quarters).
In the 10th estimation subsample, we do not undertake any under-sampling as this would interfere
in measuring how the models really perform out-of-sample.
ANNs are mathematical modeling tools which perform complex function mappings [22].ANNs
successfully represent complicated and nonlinear relationships between several input and output
variables [7]. ANNs simulate the working principles of the human brain. An ANN model is
composed of three layers of neurons. First layer is the input layer in which number of neurons
are equal to the number of input variables (in our case, 13 neurons corresponding to the input
variables defined in Section 2 other than the square of sales shock variable which is dependent
on the sales shock variable). The third layer is the output layer which has the neurons that
represent the output variables (in our case, three variables, one for target, one for bidder and
one for non-merger firms). The second layer resides between these two layers and is called
as the hidden layer. The hidden layer can be composed of single or multiple layers. In each
layer, there are several neurons. The neurons in the input layer are connected to the hidden
layer neurons. A network connects hidden layer neurons to the neurons in the output layer. Each
of the links in this network has a weight. Training phase determines the weights of the links,
using the training data set. We used MATLAB to implement the ANN model. The network is a
feed-forward backpropagation network with tan-sigmoid transfer function for hidden layer and
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backpropagation method. Multinomial logistic models examine the influence of various variables
on an unordered multinomial outcome. We used STATA to implement the multinomial logistic
model.
3. Results
3.1 ANN model results
The predictive power of theANN model is measured by the extent to which it correctly identifies the
merger category of an (firm-quarter level) observation. Correct estimation percentage is calculated
as 100 ∗ NumModelDetectedAsClassi/NumTotalClassi, where NumModelDetectedAsClassi is
the number of cases the model correctly detects in merger class i and NumTotalClassi is the total
number of cases in merger class i. We compute the correct estimation percentages of the ANN
model for different number of neurons in the hidden layer. Table 2 presents the average results of
the 10-fold cross-validation on the test data set. The first column presents the number of nodes
in the hidden layer and the following columns present target, bidder, non-merger and overall
correct detection accuracies (in percentages). Target detection accuracy varies between 32.46%
and 40.25%, bidder detection accuracy varies between 43.76% and 51.83%, and non-merger firm
detection accuracy varies between 49.74% and 53.74%. Table 2 shows that the ANN model with
10 nodes in the hidden layer performs better than the other models in terms of overall correct
detection percentage.
Table 3 shows the classification percentages for the ANN model with 10 nodes in the single
hidden layer. The rows of Tables 3 and 4 are the real identities of the observations (bidder,
target and non-merger) and the columns are the estimated identities of the observations. The
model correctly identifies target, bidder and non-merger firms with 40.25%, 45.21% and 53.24%
accuracy, respectively. The highest accuracy is for non-merger firms and the lowest accuracy is
for target firms.
Table 2. Classification accuracy for ANN models with different number of nodes in
hidden layer.
Correct detection percentage
No. of nodes Target Bidder Non-merger Overall
7 37.78 47.75 52.95 46.16
10 40.25 45.21 53.54 46.33
15 32.46 51.83 53.82 46.03
20 40.17 48.31 49.74 46.07
25 38.61 43.76 53.74 45.37
Table 3. Classification accuracy for ANN model with 10 nodes in hidden layer.
Correct detection percentage
Identity estimate Target Bidder Non-merger
Target 40.25 22.48 37.28
Bidder 24.92 45.21 29.86
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Table 4. Classification accuracy for multinomial logistic regressions.
Identity Estimate Target Bidder Non-merger
Target 40.36 22.30 37.33
Bidder 19.82 53.06 27.12
Non-merger 24.12 20.54 55.34
3.2 Multinomial logistic regression results
Table 4 presents the results of multinomial logistic regressions of the 10-fold cross-validation.
Multinomial logit regressions estimate the probability of a firm proposing a bid, soliciting a bid
and neither proposing nor receiving a bid in the next quarter in the 10% of the data designated as
test data in each validation fold. The estimated identity of a firm-quarter is a bidder-quarter if the
probability of becoming a bidder firm is larger than the probability of becoming a target firm and
non-merger firm. The estimated identity of a firm-quarter is a target-quarter if the probability of
becoming a target firm is larger than the probability of becoming a bidder firm and non-merger
firm. The model correctly identifies target, bidder and non-merger firms with 40.36%, 53.06%
and 55.34% accuracy, respectively. Similar to results of the ANN model, the highest accuracy is
for non-merger firms and the lowest accuracy is for target firms.
4. Conclusion
This paper compares the performance of ANN and multinomial logistic models in predicting
merger candidacy. Both models perform similarly while predicting target and non-merger firms.
The multinomial logit model performs slightly better in predicting bidder firms. Multinomial
logit models yield coefficient estimates that have economic meaning. ANN models work as a
blackbox and do not automatically reveal coefficient estimates. This is why we conclude that in
our sample multinomial logit models outperformANN models both in predictive and interpretative
performance.
Multinomial logit models estimate linear models. ANN model handles nonlinear relationships
between the independent and dependent variables. ANN model is also powerful in handling large
number of input variables and variables with interactions among each others. This study directly
feeds the variables that proxy for merger motives into the multinomial and ANN models. Further
research that inputs a wider range of data into the ANN model and allows it to explore linear and
nonlinear relationships in the data would prove beneficial.
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Notes
1. Other papers that compare neural network and logistic models include: Adams and Wert [1] who predicts hospital
stays, and Cooper [8] who predicts the rescheduling of international debt-service obligations of countries. Hossaina
and Nasser [23] compare neural networks and ARMA-GARCH models in forecasting financial returns.
2. Interested readers may refer to [9,45] for the definitions and in-depth discussions about the variables used in this
study.
3. Its two-digit SIC code identifies the industry of a firm. The one-digit SIC code is used when less than five firms
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4. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the closing share price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares to the
book value of equity.
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